LUCAS ET AL. vs. STEAMBOAT SWANN.

In the District Court of tie U. States for the District of Ohio.Special Term of January,1855.
M. E. LUCAS ET AL. VS. THE STEAMBOAT THOMAS SWANN, T. SWEENY
ET AL., OWNERS.
1. A libeiant, claiming damages on the ground of a collision with another boat,
must make it appear that there was no want of ordinary care and skill, in the management of his boat, and that the injury for which he claims compensation, resulted
from the sole fault of the other boat. But the faulty management of one boat,
will not excuse the want of proper care and skill in the other.
2. A case of damage resulting from inevitable accident is defined to be, "that
which a party charged with an offence, could not possibly prevent by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill."
3. There is no ground for the conclusion in this case, that the injury was unavoidable; but on the contrary, it is a case of mixed or mutual fault.
4. But to constitute a proper basis for a decree, apportioning the damages equally
to each boat, as in a case of mixed or mutual fault, the evidence must enable the
Court to find the specific faults of each, from which the injury resulted.
5. If the Court is satisfied, that both boats were in fault, and yet from the conflict
in the evidence, cannot find, with reasonable certainty, the specific faults of each,
it constitutes a case of inscrutable fault; and, in such case, in accordance with
the law as settled in the United States, a decree for the equal apportionment of
the damages as resulting from the injury, may be entered.
6. The present is adjudged to be such a case, and a decree is entered in accordance
with the principle stated.

Messrs. Walker, .Kebler and .Ford,for libellants.
Mr. T. .D. Lincoln, for respondents.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LEAvIT, J.-This is a case in Admiralty, brought by the libellants, as owners of the Steamboat "Fanny Fern," to'obtain compensation for an injury to that boat, by a collision with the Steamboat "Thomas Swann," of which the respondents are the owners.
This collision occurred a little after 4 o'clock in the morning of
28th February, 1854, on the Ohio river, some ten or twelve miles
below Wheeling, in the channel between Little Grave Creek Bar and
the Ohio shore, near the head of the bar, and at the distance of something upwards of one hundred yards from that shore. The Fern
was a stem wheel boat of about 450 tons burthen; the Swann is a
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side wheel boat, of the largest class of Ohio packet boats, and was,
at the time of the collision, one of the boats of the Union Line,
from Louisville to Wheeling.
The libellants allege, that as the result of the collision, their boat
immediately sunk in fourteen feet water: and, they claim damages
for the full value of the boat, as being a total loss. They also
allege, that the injury to the Fern was caused solely by the fault
and misconduct of those having charge of the respondent's boat;
and set forth, as the foundation of their claim for indemnity, that
the Fern was descending the river, in the proper and usual place of
a descending boat, a short distance above the head of the Grave
Creek Bar, andthat her pilot, noticing the lights of a boat coming
up, near the Ohio shore, and having no signal from her, when the
boats were within from a quarter to less than a half a mile of each
other, he gave two taps of the large bell of the Fern, thereby indicating his wish to take the left hand side of the channel. The
ascending boat proved to be' the Swann; and the libellants aver,
that she made no response to the Fern's bell, and that the Fern
continued her course dowh, in her proper place, when her pilot,
seeing the Swann veering across the channel, towards the Virginia side, promptly gave the order for stbpping and backing; and
that the boat was stopped and bqcked, and that every precaution was used to avoid a collision; but, that the Swann wrongfully
pursuing her course, across the channel, struck the Fern, nearly
at right angles, on the starboard side, near the fdot of the stairs
about fifteen feet from the stern of the boat, cutting her about twothirds through, and causing her to go down in less than one minute.
The respondents, on the other hand, deny that there was any
fault or misconduct on the part of those having charge of their
boat; and insist, that the Fern, before entering the channel between
the bar and the shore, was not in the proper place of a descending
boat, being not more than thirty yards from the Ohio shore, and
so near thereto, that in the line of vision from the 'pilot-house of
the Swann, the lights of the Fern were so blended with the lights
on shore at that point, that they could not be distinguished ; and
that from this cause the pilot of the Swan did not know, and had
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no reason to suppose, that a boat was coming down, till the bell of
the Fern was heard, at which time the boats were not more than
200 or 250 yards apart; and that instantly, on being apprised
that a boat was coming down, the pilot of the Swan gave one tap
of the large bell, to indicate that he could not take the Ohio side of
the channel, and almost simultaneously rang the bells for stopping
and backing. The respondents also insist, that when the Fern's
bell was heard, the Swan was in the proper place of an ascending
boat, of her size, at that stage of water, following the channel, and
slightly quartering towards the Virginia shore ; and that the Fern,
being close to the Ohio shore, and with every facility for passing
the Swann on that side, had no right to signal for the Virginia
side ; and that the Fern improperly attempted to cross the channel, and was nearly at right angles with it, when the boats came
together. And they insist also, that having made the attempt to
cross, she'was wrong in stopping and backing; and that the collision was the result of this improper navigation, and not any faulty
conduct on the part of the Swann.
It may be noticed here, as one of the facts about which there is
contradiction in the evidence, that the stern of the Swann struck
the Fern at an angle of about 720 quartering towards her stern ; and
that she sunk, near the head of the bar, about one hundred yards
from the Ohio shore; her stern being in deep water, and very near
the line of navigation, usually followed by both ascending and
descending boats at that point.
This brief outJine presents the nature of the controversy between
these parties. Their theories and assumptions, both in the pleadings apd by the evidence, are in direct 'conflict; and it may be
added, both cannpf be sustained. The libellants claim, that their
boat was without fault, and therefore that the respondents are
answerable for the whole damage she has suffered from the collision; while the respondents claim, that the injury to the Fern was
not occasioned by any fault on their part, but is chargeable solely
to her mismanagement.
The evidence affords no ground for any unfavorable presumption
against either of the parties, for any failure to comply with the
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requirements of the Act of Congress of 1852. Whatever of contra,diction there maybe in the proofs in other respects, it satisfactorily
appears, that each of the boats was provided with the requisite
signal lights, and that they were in good order at the time of the
collision ; and also, that each was manned with the usual and necessary number of men and officers. And it is specially worthy of
notice here, that the proof is ample, on both sides, to show that the
pilot of each boat, on duty at the time of the collision, was, in all
respects, trustworthy, and well qualified for the duties of his station.
With a view to some proper basis for a decree in this case, I have
carefully read and reflected on the great mass of evidence presented
on the hearing, partly oral, but mostly in the form of depositions.
In this effort, I havb encountered great difficulties, arising from the
discrepant and contradictory character of the evidence, for and
against the opposite claims of the parties. It is impossible, by any
mental process, or upon any known principle of estimating the preponderance of evidence, to decide with even reasonable certainty,
in what direction the scale should incline.- With equally favorable
opportunities of witnessing the occurrences to which they testify,
and with the presumption, that the witnesses on either side are
equallyintelligent, truthful and credible, it would seem to be an
arbitrary exercise of the discretion of a judge, to reject the testimony given by one party and accredit that given by the other.
To show the difficulty, if not the utter impossibility, o'f sustaining the hypothesis of either of these parties, it is only necessary to
state some of the essential features or aspects of the case, in regard
to which the evidence is in direct and irreconcilable conflict. And
first-it -is a con'ceded fact in the case, that the signal bell of the
Fern, the descending boat, was first sounded - trut as to the relative
position of the boats, when the bell was tapped, and when the pilot
of the Swann was apprised that a boat was approaching, the
testimony of the parties is essentially variant. The witnesses for
the libellants testify that the Fern, at that point, was in the proper
place of a down-going boat, some one hundred and thirty yards out
from the Ohio shore. and nearly on a line with the inner side of
the bar. On the other hand, the respondents' witnesses testify,
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that when the bell of the Fern was first tapped, she was so near to
the Ohio shore, that her lights were blended with, and could not be
distinguished from lights along the shore; thus rendering it impossible for the pilot of the Swan to know that a boat was coming
down, until her bell was heard; and also, excluding the descending
boat from the right of choosing the outer or Virginia side of the
channel, and making it altogether wrong in her to cross the channel, for the purpose of getting on that side. And the evidence is
not less conflicting, in reference to the position of the Swann, the
ascending boat, at the point where she was first seen by the pilot
of the Fern. On one side, the proof is, the Swann was coming up
the Ohio shore; on the other, that she was out in the channel,
quartering to the Virginia side. And as to the distance between
the boats, when the Fern was first seen by the pilot of the other
boat, a point of vital importance in the decision of the case, the
evidence is very discrepant. The pilot of the Fern swears, the distance was near a half a mile, and other witnesses for the libellants
state it, as upwards of a quarter of a mile; while, for the respondents it is proved, it did not exceed two hundred and fifty yards, and
in the opinion of one witness, was not more than one hundred and
fifty yards. There is also a fiat contradiction between the testimony
of the parties, as to the course of the two boats, and their position,
at the time they came together. The libellants' witnesses swear,
the Fern was running straight down the river, up to the time the
pilot tapped her bell, and was then turned slightly across towards
the Virginia side; whereas, the respondents' witnesses say, she was
running nearly square across the river, and was struck by the Swan
almost at right angles. And there is the same conflict in reference
to the position of the latter boat. The witnesses for the libellants
prove, that the Swann turned out from the Ohio shore, and was pointed
across the channel, towards the Virginia shore when the collision
took place. The witnesses on the other side say, her, course was
not changed, from the time the Fern was seen, and was but slightly
inclined towarda the Virginia shore. And again-while the witnesses on one side state positively, that the Swann ran into the
Fern, those on the other are equally clear, that it was the Fern
that struck the Swann.
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There are some of the points in reference to which the evidince is
conflicting to an extent that makes it difficult to come to a conclusion for or against either of the parties. The libellants, as the
result of this unfortunate collision, are the sole sufferers; no injury
having been sustained by the other boat; and, as already stated,
they claim indemnity for the whole amount of the injury they have
sustained. They are entitled to a decree for this, only on making
proof, that the injury resulted from the fault of those having charge
of the respondents' boat, and that there was no want of ordinary care
and skill on the part of the libellants to prevent the collision. On
the other hand, it is a well settled principle of maritime law, that
the, fault of one boat or vessel, will not excuse any want of care,
diligence or skill in another. Now, if the Court was at liberty to
regard the evidence for the libellants, to the exclusion of that
offered by the other party, there could be no'hesitation in decreeing indemnity for the full amount of the injury. That evidence
proves the respondents' boat to have been in fault, without any
blame imputable to the libellants. But, if the evidence of the
respondents is received and accredited without regard to that
adduced by the libellants, the fault would rest upon the boat of the
latter; and, the result would be, a decree dismissing the libel, at
the costs of the libellants. But for the reasons stated, I am unable, satisfactorily, to come to either of these conclusions, or enter
a decree upon either of the grounds indicated.
Without-thinking it necessary, in the view I take of this case, to
enter minutely into the examination of the evidence presented on
both sides, I am prepared to state, as the conclusion of my mind,
that the collision in controversy was not the result of inevitable or
unavoidable accident. This is defined to be, " that which a party
charged with an offence, could not possibly prevent, by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and maratime skill." 2 Dods., 83;
2 Win. Rob., 205; Flanders on Mar. Law, 298. It is not a reasonable supposition, that the injury sustained by the libellants' boat,
could have been inflicted, without some fault, and as the mere result
of unavoidable necessity. There was, at the time of this occurrence, not less than twelve feet water in the channels of the river,
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and it was then rising. At the place where the Fern sunk, near
the outer edge of the upper part of Grave Creek Bar, there was a
depth of fourteen feet. There was deep water the whole width of
the channel between the edge of the bar and the Ohio shore, which
at that stage of water, was from one hundred to one hundred and
twenty yards wide; and even upon the bar itself, there was six
feet water. There was then ample verge for these boats to have
passed, without coming in contact. And moreover, there is no disagreement in the statement of the witnesses, that the night was
calm, and although somewhat cloudy, not so dark as to render navigation difficult or dangerous. With these facts in view, there would
seem to be no difficulty, in reaching the conclusibn, that there was
a censurable want of care, caution, or skill, in the management of
these boats; and that the injury cannot be fairly placed to the
account of inevitable accident.
It follows from this conclusion, that if this is a case warranting
a decree for indemnity, it must be regarded, either as one of mixed
or mutual fault; or, of inscrutable fault. If it be a case belonging
to the first of these classes, by the well settled principles of the
maritime law-differing in this respect from the common law-the
decree must be for an equal apportionment of the injury sustained,
between the two boats, with such order in respect to the costs, as
the court may deem equitable. While I do not affirm, that such a
decree might not be justified in this case, there would seem to be
an objection to such a disposition of it. As I understand the maritime law, the Court must find, as a basis of such decree, not only
that blame is imputable to both parties, but must find specifically,
the faulty acts of each, to which the injury is to be charged. As
already intimated, it may be well doubted, whether the most searching analysis of the evidence, would result in a satisfactory conclusion as to the precise acts of which were the direct cause of the
collision. The contradictory character of the evidence involves the
facts of this case in great doubt, and renders it extremely difficult
to attain such a result with reasonable certainty. Nearly every
fact stated by the witnesses, importing censure in the management
of either of the boats, is so far impugned by opposing evidence, as
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to create doubt and uncertainty. In this state of the case, the
Court would scarcely be justified in assuming a theory, which could
only be maintained by an arbitrary repudiation of the evidence on
one side, and accrediting that offered by the other. For the reasons which will be stated hereafter, there is-no necessity for a resort
to this desperate expedient, to attain the ends of justice in this case.
It is true there is one exception to the remarks just made, that
nearly every material fact implicating either boat, is contradicted
by opposing testimony. It has not escaped the attention of the
Court, that the evidence shows conclusively, that the Swann, as
the ascending boat, failed to give the first tap of the bell, as required
under certain circumstances, by the iules of the Board of Supervising Inspectors, adopted pursuant to the Steamboat Law of 1852.
This act of Congress confers on this Board, ample authority to adopt
such rules; and they are obligatory in cases to which they fairly
apply. And a violation of any of these rules, resulting in disaster,
raises a presumption of culpability, which can only be removed by
proof that the collision is attributable to some other cause. The
rule referred to, requires the pilot of an ascending boat, "1so soon
as the. other boat shall be in sight and hearing, to sound his
bell," etc. But if, with ordinary diligence, the descending boat is
not seen, or heard in time to enable the pilot to comply with the
rule, no censure can attach for not doing so. It would seem from
the evidence of the respondents, that the Fern, from the fact that
she was too near the Ohio shore, and from the impossibility of distinguishing her lights from those on the shore, was not seen and known
to be a steamboat, until her bell was heard by the pilot of the
Swan. This fact would excuse the pilot for not complying with
the rule referred to. In reference to some other requirements contained in these rules, which have been noticed in the argument, I
have only to say, that I doubt their application to the then state of
the river, and the circumstances in which these boats were placed,
immediately preceding the collision. There was not only a wide
chainel between the Ohio shore and the bar, but in point of fact,
there was water enough on the bar itself, for either of the boats to
have passed over it. Without further remarks on this point, I have
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only to say, in reference to the rules referred to, that they must be
construed in subordination to the paramount rule of navigation,
that a collision must always be avoided if possible ; and an injury
inflicted will not be justified, unless inevitable, on the ground that
the injured boat had violated a prescribed rule.
But, I do not propose to enter into an elaborate inquiry, whether
this is a case of mixed or mutual fault, justifying a decree on that
basis. In my judgment, there are, as before intimated, obstacles
in the way of entering such a decree, in this case. And as it may
be disposed of upon another principle, according, as I think, with
strict justice and the doctrines of the maritime law, I prefer to
place it on that ground. In its results, so far as the interests of'
these parties are concerned, the decree which I propose to enter,
for an equal apportionment of the loss sustained by the collision,
are the same as if based on the finding of mixed fault.
As already intimated, I cannot, upon the evidence before me,
with very reliable certainty, adopt the conclusion, that the injury
suffered by the libellants, arose from the sole fault of those in charge
of the respondents' boat; nor can I find the reverse of this proposition to be satisfactorily established, and thus hold, that the
respondents are absolved from all liability for the injury sustained.
It is equally clear, for reasons before adverted to, that this injury
can not be fairly charged to inevitable accident. It is a fair deduction, from the facts before the Court, that the cause of this collision
is to be found in the faulty management of one or both of these
boats. And I have no hesitation in concluding, that in the excitement produced by the occasion, the pilots of both were in fault.
This is a reasonable implication, from all the circumstances involved
in the transaction. And yet, from the conflict in the evidence, itis.
difficult if not impossible, to determine to what direct and specific acts
the collision is to be attributed. And this, as I understand the maritime law, makes it a case of damage or loss, arising from a cause that
is inscrutable. It is not, of course, to be inferred from this, that any
doubt exists, that the immediate cause of the injury to the Fern,
was the collision between the boats; but it implies, that the causes
which led to this result are involved in obscurity and doubt.
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In this view, it only remains to inquire, what decree shall be made
in this case. This is the only occasion on which this point has been
before this Court, and I confess, that from my limited experience
in the administration of maritime law, I enter upon its consideration
with some hesitancy, and with great reason to distrust the conclusions to which I might be led, unaided by the light which others
have thrown upon the subject.
It is insisted by the counsel for the respondents, that the maritime law gives no redress for an injury resulting from the collision
of boats or vessels, unless the Court can find from the evidence that
it was the result of the sole fault of one; or that there was mixed
or mutual fault. This ground supposes that there can be no decree
for an apportionment of the loss, if, for. any reason, the cause of the
injury is inscrutable, or left in such doubt that there can be no
satisfactory finding of specific facts.
The English admiralty decisions referred to by counsel would
seem to sustain this position. They certainly show, that where the
cause of the injury is inscrutable, and the proof does not implicate
either of the parties as in fault, there can be no decree for an apportionment of the loss. I do not think they establish it as the law in
England, that where there is reason to donclude one or both the
parties was in fault, but the evidence leaves it uncertain which, that
no decree can be rendered for a contribution by moieties. I do not,
however, propose a critical examination of these cases, as I consider
the question referred to as satisfactorily settled in this country.
In his commentaries on Bailments, Sees. 609, 610, Judge Story
discusses this question, and maintains the right and expediency of
dividing the loss, as between colliding vessels, where the fault is
inscrutable. His.language is: "Another case. has been put by a
learned commentator on commercial law. It is, where there has
been some fault or neglect, but on which side the blame lies is
inscrutable, or is left by the evidence in a state of uncertainty. In
such a case, many of the maritime states of continental Europe have
adopted the rule to apportion the loss between the vessels." The
writer referred to by Judge Story is Mr. Bell, whose commentaries
on the laws of Scotland have given him a distinguished reputation
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as a jurist. And in reference to the doctrine asserted by this
author, Judge Story reniarks, that "if the question be still open for
controversy, there is great cogency in the reasoning of Mr. Bell,
in favor of adopting the rule of apportioning the loss between the
parties. Many learned jurists have supported the justice and equity
of such a rule; and it especially has the strong aid of' Pothier, and
Valin, and Emerigon." In a note, appended to the section before
cited, Judge Story has inserted the argument of Mr. Bell in the
maintenance of his views, the force and clearness of which certainly
entitle it to the highest consideration.
I am not informed whether the doctrine, thus approvingly referred
to by Judge Story, has been distinctly asserted by him in any case
calling for its judicial recognition. But another learned American
judge, eminent for his profound research in the doctrines of the
maritime law, and his able and judicious administration of that law,
holds the rule for the apportionment of damages, in case of an injury
by collision, where the fault is uncertain or inscrutable, as indisputable, in the United States. In the case of the Scioto, reported
in Davies' Reporfs, 859, Judge Ware, the learned Judge of the
United States for the District of Maine, says: "This rule in admiralty-a contribution by moieties-seems to prevail in three cases:
first, where there has been no fault on either side; second, where
there may have been fault, but it is uncertain on which side it lies;
and third, where there has been fault on both sides." In the syllabus of this case, the point is stated thus :-" But if it-the collision-happens without fault in either party, or if there was fault,
and it cannot be ascertained which vessel was in fault, or if both
were in fault, then the damage and loss are divided between them,
in equal shares."
I may be permitted to remark, though I have not seen the
reported cases, that I am informed that since the decision in the
case of the Scioto, before referred to, Judge Ware has asserted the
same principle in other cases. To what extent other American
judges have affirmed it, I have not the means of information. But,
having the high sanction of Story and Ware-both known as able
exponents of the maritime law-and sustained, too, by the most
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distinguished jurists of continental Europe, I have no hesitancy in
applying it to the case before the Court.
A late elementary writer on maritime law, in this country, of high
reputation for accuracy and learning, affirms, that "without question, the doctrine above stated is the American law on this subject."
This writer says: "Where the collision is evidently the result of
error, neglect, or want of precaution, which error, neglect, or want
of precaution is not directly traceable- to either party, but is inscrutable, or left by the evidence in a state of uncertainty, there the
rule of the maritime law is, that the loss must be apportioned
between the 'parties, in equal moieties." Flanders on Mar. Law,
296. This writer admits that a different rule prevails in England,
but very justly remarks, "that the rule adopted in England does
not necessarily determine the law for us, in the United States.
And accordingly, we find that the Courts of Admiralty in this
country adhere to the rule of the ancient maritime law." Ibid, 298.
Adopting this view of the law, and satisfied that the application
of the principle adverted to meets the real equity of the case, I shall
decree an equal apportibnment of the loss between the parties. As
already stated, the contradictory and irreconcilable character of the
evidence, leaves the mind in doubt and, uncertainty as to some of
the important facts in the case; but there is a satisfactory ground
for the conclusion that both the colliding boats were in fault, and
therefore that each should contribute to the loss. And I may
remark here, that in my judgment, the enforcement of the principle
here sanctioned, is not only vindicated as in itself just and equitable,
but in its application to the navigation of the western waters, as
altogether expedient. Heretofore, in cases of collision, the great
object of each party has been to prove his adversary exclusively in
the wrong, and thereby avoid all pecuniary liability. And, it is
almost proverbially true, that in collision cases, each party has but
little difficulty in sustaining, by the proofs, any state of facts which
may.be insisted on. In most cases, the witnesses on either side,
from a misapprehension of the facts, or a dishonest purpose of representing them falsely, involve the transaction in such doubt and
uncertainty as to render it impossible to reach a satisfactory con-
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clusion. If, under such circumstances, a reasonable ground is furnished for the conclusion that there is fault on both sides, and that
each party should share in the loss sustained, there would be greater
caution and vigilance in navigation, and less effort and less temptation, by corrupt or unfair means, to misrepresent or distort facts.
I It appears satisfactorily, that the injury resulting from the collision fell almost exclusively on the Fern. The injury to the Swann
was so slight that the respondents have set up no claim to remuneration. The result, therefore, of the decree will be, that one-half
of the actual loss or injury sustained by the Fern, must be paid by
the respondents. The value of the Fern is variously estimated by
the witnesses who have testified on that subject, at sums ranging
from $12,000 to $20,000. For the purposes of this decree, the
Court fix her value at $15,500. There is proof in the case, that
the Fern has been raised, but no evidence was offered of her value,
including her engine and machinery, after the collision. This
value, whatever it may be, will be deducted from' the sum of
$15,500, and the respondents are decreed to pay the libellants 9nehalf of the balance. It will be necessary to appoint a Commissioner
to inquire into and report the value of the Fern, after the injury.
This will be provided for in the decree to be entered. In reference
to the costs, under the circumstances of the case, no discrimination
will be made between the parties, and they will therefore be paid
equally.

.'n the Supreme Court of Alabama.
'MOBILE

MARINE DOCK AND FIRE INSURANCE C03I]ANY

'S.

M'MILLAN AND SON.

1. A marine policy is to be construed according to the general and known course of
trade with regard to vessels of a similar character, with a similar cargo, and on a
similar voyage, to that insured.
2. A policy of insurance was made on a cargo of cotton, shipped on a sea-going
steamer, the risk to commence at the port of Mobile, and to continue and endure

until the goods were safely landed at thevort of YZew Orleans. The instrument was
in the usual form, and employed only the usual terms, of a marine policy. The
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vessel arrived in due time at her accustomed berth on the southern shore of Lake
Pontchart5ain, whioh is well known to be the port of N'ew Orleans for vessels of
such character, and from whence goods are conveyed by railway to the city itself.
After she had discharged safely a portion of her cargo, an accidental fire destroyed, on the wharf, so much as she had landed. Held, that the risk under the
policy terminated on a delivery at the wharf, and did not continue until delivery
to the consignee, or his agent; that it was not necessary that the goods should be
landed at the place where it was usual for the consignee to receive and take charge
of them; and that the insurers were, therefore, not liable.
8. In this case, the policy was a valued one upon 198 bales of cotton, valued at $50
a bale. Of these, 134 bales had been landed, and been destroyed by the fire.
Held, that the contract was a severable one; that the insurers would have bein
liable, if at all, only for so many bales as were actually destroyed; and that the
insured could not recover as for a total loss.

Error to the City Court of Mobile.
McMillan & Son shipped by the steam-packet Helen, 198 bales
of cotton, from the port of Mobile to the city of New Orleans,
and effected a policy of insurance thereon, in the office of the
appellants, which is in the usual form of marine policies; the risk to
commence at the port of Mobile, and to continue and endure until
the goods were safely landed at the port of New Orleans. The
Helen arrived in due time at her accustomed place of discharging
her cargo on the southern shore of Lake Pontchartrain, and had
unloaded 184 of the bales, when the steamer Georgia came up and
anchored. A fire immediately broke out upon the Georgia, which
communicated to the cotton which the Helen had put out on the
wharf, and consumed it. The remaining 64 bales were delivered to
the consignee in thecity, and accepted without objection. It
appeared that the boat had a standing arrangement with the Jefferson and Carrolton Railroad, to convey the cotton from the lake port
where it was landed to the city of New Orleans, the boat collecting
the entire freight and paying to the railroad the proportion due to
it. This action was brought by McMillan & Son, against the Insurance Company to recover on the policy for.the 184 bales which
were burned. The other facts necessary to a more complete understanding of the case will appear in the opinion. The plaintiffs below
had judgment for $50 per bale-$6,700-to reverse which the
case was taken to the Supreme Court.
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The case was ably argued by
Mr. P. Hamilton, for the appellant, and
Mr. B. H. Smith, for the appellee.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CHILTON, 0. J.-It is a rule of construction settled by numerous
authorities, that every usage of trade, which is so well\tettled, or so
generally known that all persons engaged in that trade may fairly
be considered as contracting with reference to it, is regarded as
forming part of every policy designed to protect risks in that
trade, unless by the express terms of the policy, or by necessary
implication, such inference is repelled. 1 Duer on Ins. 195, §§ 42,
43; ib. 267, §§ 60, 61, 62; Arnould on Ins. (1850 ed.) 65; Hughes
on Ins. 109, 110; 1 Phillips on Ins. (ed 1853,) 79 et seq.
The contract declared on is essentially a marine policy, providing
for protection of goods shipped on board the Helen, upon a sea
voyage, and against sea risks, and there is nothing contained in this
policy which, by a fair construction, can be made to extend to and
cover terrene risks after the cotton shall have been safely landed at
the usual place of discharging the cargo by the vessel; unless, indeed,.
under the facts, we are required to hold that the port of New Orleans
means the port at the city, and not the port which is known by the
same name on Lake Pontchartrain, where the cargo was put on
shore.
It is conceded that the policy is to be construed liberally for the
benefit of the assured and with a due regard to its design and object
as an undertaking to indemify. .ent vs. Bird, Cowp. Rep. 585;
aodsall et al. vs. Boldero, 9 East, 72-82; Hughes on Ins. 145
(marg. page); per Lord Ellenborough in Bainbridgevs. Neilson, 10
East, 844; Pelly vs. Royal -ExchangeAssurance, 1 Burrows, 849;:
Wolff vs. Horneastle, 1 Bos. & Pul. 322; Kaines vs. Knightly,
Skin. 55; 2 Saund. Rep. 200, (a) note 1. "It is certain," said Lee,.
C. 5., in Pelly vs. Roya1-E. Ass., supra, "that in construingpolicies the strictum jus or apex juris is not to be laid hold on; but
they are to be construed largely for the benefit of trade and.for the
insured." Nevertheless, as was said by Lord Ellenborough, C. J.,
in Robertson vs. -French, "The same rules of construction which
43
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apply to all other instruments apply equally to this instrument of a
policy of insurance, namely, that it is to be construed according to
its sense and meaning, as collected in the first place from the terms
used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their
plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have generally in
respect of the subject matter, as by the known usage of trade, or
the like, acquired a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense
of the same words ; or unless the contract evidently points out that
they must in the particular instance, and in order to effectuate the
immediate intention of the parties to that contract, be understood
in some other special and peculiar sense. The only difference between policies of assurance and other- instruments in this respect, is,
that the greater part of the printed language of them being invariable and uniform, has acquired from use and practice, a known and
definite meaning, and that the words superadded in writing, (subject indeed always to be governed in point of construction by the
language and terms with which they are accompanied,) are entitled
nevertheless, if there should be any reasonable doubt upon the sense
and meaning of the whole, to have a greater effect attributed to them
than to the printed words, inasmuch as the written words are the
immediate language and terms selected' by the parties themselves
for the expression of their meaning, and the printed words are a
general formula adapted equally to their'case and that of all other
contracting parties upon similar occasions and subjects." 4 East,
135, 136.
The language in the policy before us, as we have said, provides
against loss from certain perils while the goods are in process of
marine transportation. They are shipped on board the Helen, upon
a voyage, from the port of Mobile to the port of New Orleans, enumerating the perils and adventures usually inserted in marine policies, and it fixes the termini of the risk, the point a quo being the
port of Mobile, "and to continue and endure until the said goods
shall be safely landed at the port of New Orleans."
We must not confound the obligation of the insurer with that of
the carrier. The boat,.by the bill of lading was obliged to have the
cotton taken to the city, and the consignees were not bound to re-
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ccive it at 'the lake depot of the railroad, but it by no means follows,
that the insurance extends to this terrene transportation. According to its terms, it closes with the terminus of the voyage of the
Helen, after the goods shall have been safely landed. There is no
proof whatever, to show that such policies were regarded by merchants, insurers or shippers, as usually embracing such risks, and
we have found no case which authorizes the extension of a marine
policy to cover land transportation. Whether, indeed, it would be
competent to extend the language employed in this policy by proof
of usage or custom so as to make it cover losses after the goods had
been safely landed in the 'usual way, and at the usual place of discharging the cargo by the Helen, is a question of some difficulty,
and one which we are not now called upon to decide. So far as
the proof goes upon this point, it is adverse to the construction contended for by the assured, two cases being shown where policies had
been effected to .-rew Orleans instead of to the port of Aew Orleans,
in which it was considered by the parties that the risk continued
to the city; but in both of these a greater premium was paid than
was required to insure to the port of New Orleans, as understood to
be the point of discharging the cargo at the south shore of Lake Pontehartain. But we lay no stress on these cases as establishing a custom. We rest our decision upon the terms of the policy itself, considered, of course with reference to what is usually done by such a
vessel with such a cargo, in such a voyage, all which must be considered as forming a part of the policy, as much so as if inserted in
it. 1 Burr., 350; 2 Saund., 200 (a.) n. 1. Both the assurer and insured are chargeable with a knowledge of the course of this trade,
and are presumed to contract with reference to it. Noble vs. Iennoway, Doug., 510; Salvador vs. Hopkins, 3 Burr. 1712; Vallance
vs. Dewae, 1 Camp., 505, n. ; ib. 508; 3 ib. 200; 1 Taunt., 463;
Selw. N. P. 963; 1 Arnould Ins. 43; ib. 66; Hughes Ins. 146, bottom p.
The parties then knew that the Helen landed her goods at the -port
of New Orleans, on the wharf at Lake Pontehartrain. They knew
this vessel did not go to the city of New Orleans, they insert no
words in the policy making the liability of the insurer co-extensive
with that of the carrier, nor extending it beyond a "safe landing of
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the goods" upon the termination of the voyage; no custom or usage
is shown to extend the voyage, and of consequence, the risk, to the
city of New Orleans, and such being the case, we should do violence
to the terms of-their contract to continue the risk after the voyage
had terminated, and the goods were safely on land at the usual place
of discharging them.
The risk is at an end whenever the goods can be considered as
landed according to the usual course of business, at the accustomed
port of destination, although they may never have been delivered
into the hands of the consignees. 1 Arnould on Ins., 437 ; aatliffe
vs. Bourne, 4 Bing., N. 0. 314; S. 0. in House Lords 7 M. and
Gr., 850.
It follows from what we have said, that the court erred in the
charges which held the insurer liable until the goods were delivered
to the consignee or some one for him. So also in the qualification
given to the charge asked, which assumed that the goods must be
landed at the place where it is usual for the consignee to receive
and take charge of them. The delivery to the consignee, as well
as the usual place where he was accustomed to receive and take
charge of the goods, could not affect the liability of the insurer, so
as to extend the risk beyond the terminus of the voyage. These
were questions between the consignee, or owner and the carrier. It
was certainly competent for the parties to contract for covering
losses which should come to the goods upon their marine passage
and until safely landed, leaving their overland passage unprotected
by the policy. This, we have held, was the effect of the policy before us, and as the terminus of the marine risk was not the terminus
of transportation contracted for by the carrier, it was erroneous to
make the liability of the insurer depend either upon the delivery of
the goods to the consignee, or at a place where he usually received
and took charge of them.
The next question 'vhich arises is, did the errors which we have
noticed, injuriously affect the rights of the insurer. If they did
not, we cannot reverse; for it is well settled that an error which
can do no injury works no reversal. Porter vs. Nash,1 Ala. Rep.
452; Caruthers vs. Mardis, adm'r, 3 ib. 599; 9 Por. Rep. 403;
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Denley vs. Gamp, 23 Ala. Rep., 659; PYane vs. Cathcart, 8 Alab.
726; Smith vs. Hfouston, id. 737.
If the contract was entire; if, in other words, the engagement to
safely land the 198 bales of cotton was not complied with until the
whole were linded in safety, then the errors of the court worked no
injury, since it is conceded that only 134 of the bales were landed
and they were consumed by fire before the others were put on
shore.
Waiving the fact that the first count in the complaint expressly
states that the cotton was valued at $50 per bale, and the statement contained in the bill of exceptions that "the plaintiff proved
the contract of insurance with the defendant upon 198 bales of cotton, valued at $50 per bale," &c., we think the contract must be
regarded so far severable as to exonerate the underwriters for that
portion which was safely landed. The contract is one of indemnity.
The valuation is settled by the agreement of the parties, so that in
ease of loss, proof of value may be dispensed with; but where the
articles are separate and each parcel is unaffected in value, whether
considered separately or aggregately, there is no good reason why
the failure safely to land one bale should make the underwriters
liable to pay the aggregate value of the 198 bales. It could not be
maintained that the underwriters would have been exempt from
liability had the appellees, after effecting the policy upon 198 bales,
only shipped 197, and these had been destroyed by some of the
perils embraced by the policy. They could not be allowed to say,
"true, the loss has occurred by reason of a risk insured against,
but the assured failed to ship the number of bales specified in the
policy, and the contract was entire-we must be liable for the 198
bales or for nothing." The rule is that if less than the number
specified in the policy are shipped, the assured has the right to deimand a corresponding return of the premium; 2 Arnould on In. 12,
275. We think the cases of Gracie vs. The Marine IFns. Co., 8
Oranch, 75, and the same vs. The Maryland ins. Co. ib. 84, fully
sustain the view we have above taken. In the latter case, a part
only of the cargo was landed, and the policy provided for the continuation of the risk, "until the said goods shall be safely landed,"
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&c. If no part of the goods could have been "safely landed" until
the whole were landed, then in that case, there would have been
a total loss, and the assured wauld have been unaffected by the
warranty against particular average loss. But the court held otherwise, and discharged the underwriters upon the ground that the loss
was partial, a portion of the goods having been safely landed within
the meaning of the policy, and hence the assured was affected by
the warranty against particular average.
We haveseen that the consideration for the insurance, the premium, is susceptible of apportionment. It is - on the value of
the cotton shipped, and that each bale may be severed from the
others without affecting its value. The true rule then, in such cases,
is 'to consider the contract as entire with respect to each measure
and not in respect of the whole lot. Story on Con. §§ 24, p. 18;
ib. 21, et seq.
The case of Gardner et al. vs. Smith, 1 Johns. Cas. 141, is relied
upon by the counsel for the appellees. In that, by the terms of
the policy, the risk was to continue until twenty-four hours after
the goods named in the margin were landed; the risk providing
against seizure of the goods as illicit trade. A portion of the goods
had been landed more than twenty-four hours, when the whole were
seized as illicit. Justice Lansing said, "the insurance being entire,
we are of opinion that the risk continued on the entire goods, until
twenty-four hours after all of them were landed."
Perhaps a distinction may be taken between the case cited and
the one before us, but if it be parallel, we are not disposed to follow it. Nor are we alone in doubting its authority. An able writer upon the law of insurance does not hesitate to doubt it, and to
state it as the better doctrine "that the risk terminates on each
parcel at the end of twenty-four hours after it is landed." See 1
Phillips on Ins. ed. 1853, p. 539 § 972.
After the best consideration we have been able to bestow upon
the case, we are satisfied the court below mistook the law in the
charges which conflict with the views above expressed. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded.
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Waukesha Circuit Court, Wisconsin-lMay, 1855.
THE MILWAUKIE

AND

MISSISSIPPI R. R. CO. vs. THE SUPERVISORS OP

WAUKESHA. COUNTY, ET AL.
1. It is provided by the Constitution of Wisconsin, Art 8, ? 1, that "the rate of taxation shall be uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the Legislature shall direct."

In 18.54, the Legislature of that State passed an act requir- .4

ing "all Railroad Companies which were or should be organized within the State,"
to pay to the State Treasurer annually, for the use of the State, "a
one per cent. of the gross earnings of their respective roads."

sum equal to

The Act further de-

clared, that "this amount of tax shall take the place and be in fall of all of the
taxes of every name and kind upon said road, and the property belonging to
the said companies or the stock held by individuals therein; and it 'shall not be
lawful to assess thereupon any other or further assessment or tax for any purpose
whatever."
Held, that this act was not unconstitutional, though the annual assessment on
Railroad Companies, was to be on income, instead of on property, as in other
cases; and though the companies were exempted thereby from town, county, and
district taxes.

Demurrer to Injunction Bill.
CH. J.-The Legislature of this state, on the first of
April, 1854, passed an Act requiring "all Railroad Companies
which were or should be organized within the state," to pay to the
State Treasurer annually, for the use of the state, "a sum equal to
one per centum of the gross earnings of their respective roads."
The Act further declares that this amount of tax shall take the
place and be in full of all of the taxes of every name and kind upon
said road, and the property belonging to the said Companies or the
stock held by individuals therein; andit shall not be lawful to assess
thereupon any other or further assessment or tax for any purpose
whatever."
HUBBELL,

Deeming this solemn Act of the Legislature unauthorized, the
Assessors of the town of Eagle and of other towns in the counties of
Waukesha and Milwaukie, returned the property of the complainants for the year 1854, and taxes were levied thereupon as if no
such law had existed.
The complainants filed their bill, and obtained a writ of injunction
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out of this Court, temporarily restraining the collection of those
taxes. To this bill the defendants interposed a demurrer.
The question now to be determined is, whether this law is valid
or void, under the Constitution of the state. There is, I believe,
but one section of the Constitution applicable to the subject.Sectionl, of Article 8, is as follows :-"The rule of taxation shall
be uniform, and taxes shall be levied upon such property as the
Legislature shall prescribe."
The defendants contend that under the law in question, 'the rule
of taxation" is not "uniform ;" 1st, Because it establishes a rule of
taxation for property belonging to the Companies mentioned, different from the general rule applicable to the taxation of other property
-it being a tax upon income, instead of a ratable tax upon value;
2d, Because it levies a State tax, and exempts from town, county
and district taxes ; 8d, Because it establishes a new mode of levying
taxes, differing from the general rule. A point was also made, that
the Attorney General ought to be a party defendant, but as that is a
question of practice, and as I do not think the decree in this case
will bar or affect the right of the State to collect the one per centum
required to be paid to the Treasurer by the Act, I shall not discuss
the question.
• I am compelled to dissent from all the positions taken by the
defendants. Their error arises in part, I apprehend, from looking
at the first clause of the section quoted, without due regard to the
remainder. The last clause qualifies and controls the first:
"Taxes shall be levied upon such property as the Legislature shall
prescribe." No property can be lawfully taxed until the Legislature
authorizes and requires it to be done-and, of course, no property
can be taxed when the Legislature prohibits its being done. The
legislature is vested with the absolute power of declaring what property throughout the State shall be, and what shall not be, subject
to taxation.
This power has been variously exercised from the first organization of the State Government; and almost every Legislature has
restricted or extended the quantity or character of property coming
within the rule. Large amounts, of both -real and personal pro-
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perty, have been wholly exempted from taxation. For instance, all
property of the United States, and of the State; all property of the
several counties, cities, villages, towns and school districts, used or
intended for corporate purposes-personal property exempt by law
from execution, not exceeding in value $200; the personal property
of all incorporated literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions, and all such real estate belonging to them, as shall be
actually occupied for the purposes of their incorporation; all houses
of public worship and the lots on which they are situated, and the
pews, slips and furniture therein; every parsonage and all burial
grounds, tombs and rights of burial; all public libraries and the real
or personal property belonging to, or connected with the same; also,
the property of cemetery associations; of the state and county
medical societies; and probably, that of many other persons and
corporate bodies, which I have not noticed. All this has been wholly
exempted.
This exercise of power, on the part of the Legislature, has not, to
my knowledge, been questioned, and there is no doubt that to this
long list, the Legislature might have added, the property of all
Railroad and Plank Road Companies. And, if it might exempt
wholly, why not in part? The major power includes the minor.
A general power to pardon, includes the right to annex conditions
and to grant reprieves.
I see no reason why, upon this principle, the law in question,
which operates as a partial exemption from general taxation, may
not be valid. Regarding the annual payment to the state as a tax,
as the defendants claimed, why might not the Legislature grant
exemption in all other respects ? The law certainly is not void,
because it is not worse, and does not confer greater priviliges upon
these companies-to wit, total exemption.
But I regard the payment to the State, not as a tax, but as a
bonus or compensationfor the exemption granted. The whole substance and effect of the law is to relieve the Companies absolutely
from all ordinary taxes for ordinary purposes, upon the condition
of an annual payment to the State. Had the Legislature exempted
their property from ordinary taxation, in consideration of their
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doing some service to the State-such as carrying troops or public
stores free of charge, no one would call the service a tax, or question the validity of the exemption. It would be a privilege granted
for a service rendered. This is the precise character and effect of
the act in question. The same principle runs through various laws.
In respect to these same Companies, because it was believed they
would confer important benefits upon the public, by the construction
of their roads, the right was granted to them, in the name and on
behalf of the state, to take private property for their use, upon just.
compensation. For like reasons, a law was, until recently, in force
authorizing individuals to erect mill-dams upon their own lands,
and thereby cause the lands of others to be overflowed, making such
compensation only as the law provided for. The various cases of
exemption, before referred to, are but examples on the same principle,-a privilege granted in consideration of some real or supposed
benefit conferred upon the public or the State. Now, the Legislature having full power to grant the privilege of exemption to these
companies, has done it upon its own terms, that of paying to the
State a portion of their annual income, and I see no ground of principle upon which to deny the power, or to question its rightful
exercise.
But, allowing to the defendants the benefit of their own premises
in their broadest scope, I am still forced to the same conclusion.
It is contended that the payment to the State, being a tax, and the
amount of such tax being regulated by the amount of annual income
while all other taxes are governed by the judgment of assessors as
to the value of property, "the rule of taxation" is not "uniform."
Were the complainants alone subjected to this rule, I am not prepared to say the objection would be without foundation. But all
Railroads and Plank roads are subject to the same rule. It is,
doubtless a departure from the general law, and amounts to a declaration that this class of property shall have a rule by itself. But
is such a distinction incompatible with the constitution ? Many
taxes for local and special purposes have been levied and collected,
without an assessment made in conformity to the general law.
Almost every town, and especially almost every city and village in
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the State, present instances of this species of taxation, for roads,
streets, side-walks, and other local improvements. The Constitution of the United States declares, that " all duties, imposts, and
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." But no
one has contended that the same duty, impost or excise, should be
imposed upon every species of property. On the contrary, Congress, which has the sole power, "to levy and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises," requires different classes of articles to pay
different duties,-some higher, and some lower-regulating the
duty on some kinds of property, by the value, and on others by the
quantity. Yet, I have never found a judicial decision, holding.that
because one class of property paid one rate of duty, and another
class a different rate, the duties were not "uniform."
If,upon the same class of articles, there had been one rate required at New York, and a different one at Boston or New Orleans,
doubtless the constitutional provision would have been violated.
So, in the present case, had the legislature prescribed one rate of
taxation, for one town or county, and a different rate for other
towns or counties, there could be little doubt of its error. But, so
long as each class of property, in every part of the State, and under
like circumstances, is subjected to the same rule, it is difficult to see
how the principle of the Constitution is violated, much less how the
law is so grossly and palpably wrong, as to warrant the interference
of the Courts, declaring it absolutely void. I see no constitutional
objection to a law, (should the legislature see fit to pass one) exempting all sheep in the State from taxation, or to a law requiring
all woolen or cotton factories, to pay to the State Treasurer one
per cent. of their gross earnings, as a commutation for all ordinary
taxes. Yet, should the legislature by law, declare the sheep of one
man exempt, or authorize one manufacturing company to pay a
bonus in lieu of general taxation, there would be good reason for
holding that the rule was not uniform, and that such law was void.
Under any view which I have been able to take of this case, I
cannot but regard the act of April 1st, 1854, (whether its provisions be wise and equal or otherwise,) as within the constitutional
powers of the Legislature, and therefore valid.
The defendant's demurrer must be over-ruled.

